Okinawa and the Ten
Go Campaign
In order to achieve maximum success against the American
invasion of Okinawa, it was imperative that both the Japanese army and navy
cooperate. Although both branches drafted plans for the joint venture, the army
plan was adopted. Col. Ichiji Sugita, former Operations Staff Officer at
Imperial General Headquarters, would later claim that "the Navy took an
extremely negative and indifferent attitude in formulating the Outline of the
Operations Plan of the Imperial Army and Navy in January 1945. The new
operations plan was formulated with the agreement of the Navy only after
enthusiastic suggestion by the Army." This was also the case with the
planning for the Ten Go Operation. Capt. Toshikazu Omae, who served as Planning
Section Chief, Naval General Staff during that period, later reported:
The actual condition
of the Navy's air strength at that time (especially from the viewpoint of
training) regrettably would not allow the Navy to participate in the OKINAWA
Air Operations which were expected to occur in March or April. The Navy
generally desired to avoid the hitherto gradual attrition of semi-trained
personnel and did not wish to engage in operations at OKINAWA and other fronts,
much less the homeland, until about May, by which time it would have
accumulated sufficient fighting strength.
Although both branches of the Japanese military were
committed to cooperate against the Americans at Okinawa, the planning ran into
problems. Targets to be attacked by the army forces were convoys and troop
carriers. These vessels were easier to hit and pilots required less training
for the missions. By comparison, the navy targets were the carrier task forces,
which were more difficult to attack and required greater flying skills.
Japanese navy planning called for additional special attack training. According
to Cmdr. Yoshimori Terai, former officer in charge of Air Operations, Naval
General Staff, "From the beginning, air preparations (special attack
planes) were not expected to be completed until the end of May. Although we
desired to delay the American advance on OKINAWA through the Second TAN
Operations (attack on ULITHI Base), but as a result of their failure, we were
forced to face the Okinawa Operations unprepared."
The situation was no better for the army. With the failure
of the operations against Ulithi and the accelerated advance of the American
forces toward Okinawa, the army was caught in the time trap as well. According
to Japanese naval officers involved in the planning for Ten Go, "the
preparations of the 6 Air Army were even more behind schedule than those of the
Navy." Still, cooperation between the branches was necessary. Navy
Directive No. 540 of 1 March 1945 detailed the extent of that cooperation.
The Army-Navy Joint
Central Agreement on Air Operations
1. Policy To destroy the enemy, who is expected to invade
the East China Sea and the vicinity, with a display of the combined air
strength of the Army and the Navy and at the same time to strengthen the direct
Homeland defense. In order to execute the above-mentioned operations, emphasis
will be placed on build-up and use of the special attack strength.
2. The principle of air operational guidance in each area:
a. Air operations in the East China Sea and the vicinity
(Formosa, the Nansei Islands, Southeast China, Kyushu and Korea).
b. The Army-Navy air forces will immediately deploy in the
East China Sea and the vicinity and destroy enemy invading units.
c. The chief targets for the Navy air forces will be enemy
carrier striking task forces, and for the Army, enemy transport convoys.
However, the Army will cooperate as much as possible in the attack against
enemy carrier striking task forces.
Navy Directive No. 513, issued by Adm. Koshiro Oikawa on 20
March 1945, spelled out the goals of the Ten Go Operation. Its first priority
was the destruction of the American carrier task forces that had been attacking
Japan. This was to be accomplished by the mass use of kamikaze aircraft,
suicide boats, manned torpedoes, and midget submarines. A secondary target was
the American invasion fleet operating in and around Okinawa. Of particular
importance were the air bases on Okinawa. Should they fall into American hands,
the security of the home islands would be further imperiled.
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