April 7 1945—Sonderkommando Elbe

Sonderkommando Elbe (Special Command Elbe), one of the most bizarre units in the Luftwaffe, flew its only mission on April 7. The unit was the brainchild of Oberst Hajo Herrmann, who resurrected his once-rejected proposal for a bomber-ramming formation in January, after he had joined Gemaj. Peltz’s command. With Peltz’s approval, Herrmann got Chief of Staff Koller’s permission to present his proposal to Göring. He wrote a letter for Göring’s signature that solicited volunteers from the advanced training, fighter training and operational fighter units for a special operation “from which there is only the slightest possibility of your return.” Somewhat to Herrmann’s surprise, since it implicitly condemned Göring’s own conduct of the war, the Reichsmarschall signed it. Göring’s letter was read to the fighter units on March 8, and volunteers soon began reporting to Stendal, the Elbe base. On the radio the unit was always referred to as Schulungslehrgang Elbe (Training Course Elbe), which confused Allied intelligence as to its purpose.

Although the operation qualified as a Selbstopfer (suicide) plan, the pilots did have a real chance of survival. The plan called for the exclusive use of Bf 109 variants with high-altitude engines and metal propellers, to be used as scythes. The tactical unit for the mission was to be the Schwarm, each led by an experienced pilot. It was anticipated that the other pilots would be novices. The fighters were to climb to 11,000 meters (36,000 ft.), out-climbing any escorts encountered, and would receive their orders from the IX. Fliegerkorps (Jagd) transmitter at Treuenbrietzen, which had a 200-km (120-mile) range to this altitude. The fighters would then dive on their targets singly, from above. The bombers’ wings and engines were suggested as the aiming points, but Obfw. Willi Maximowitz, an ex-Sturmstaffel “ramming expert” brought in to lecture the pilots, claimed that clipping off the tail section would surely bring down the bomber with less hazard to the German pilots, and that advice was taken by most of them, even though they considered his own experiences in a heavily armored Fw 190 irrelevant to their own situation. Most of the Bf 109s were lightened by removal of their radio transmitters, all guns but a single cowling-mounted MG 131 machine gun, and most of the ammunition. Most pilots also had their Revi gunsights removed, to facilitate bailing out.

Koller scaled down Herrmann’s ambitious plan, code-named Werwolf (Werewolf), considerably. The requested 1,000 aircraft were reduced to 350, and then to 180. The number of volunteers was restricted to 300. Very few commissioned officers, and no experienced, decorated fighter formation leaders volunteered, so Herrmann was forced to draft some experienced officers from his non-operational KG(J) units. Command was given to Major Otto Köhnke, a bomber pilot who had been awarded the Knight’s Cross in KG 54, and had lost a leg in combat. Common characteristics of the true volunteers, according to unit survivor and author Arno Rose, were a lower-middle class, non-religious background; low rank; youth (most were less than 21 years old); loyalty to comrades and the Reich; obedience; and a desire to continue flying rather than be ordered to the infantry. Many sought revenge against the Terrorflieger who had destroyed their homes and killed their families. Their training at Stendal was very scanty, comprising anti-Semitic and nationalist movies, political lectures by college professors, and a single lecture on tactics by Maximowitz. The food and drink at Stendal were very good, however, and were recalled fondly by the survivors.

On the night of April 4–5 the pilots were taken from Stendal to the seven bases chosen for the operation, where they waited for the next major Eighth Air Force raid. This took place on the 7th. Herrmann, in the Treuenbrietzen control room, ordered the Elbe pilots to scramble. It was a clear, very cold day, good considering his pilots’ limited flying skills, but bad for their comfort; they were not issued flying suits, and most wore only their light service uniforms. Unfortunately for Herrmann, the Americans had a large number of targets, and the stream split up into no fewer than 60 small formations, creating chaos in his control room as his officers attempted to sort them out. The pilots heard nothing but nationalist songs and exhortations over their one-way radios until and unless they were finally given target instructions. Their fuel tanks had been only partially filled for their one-way flights, and some had to break off their missions early and return to base. Whether successful or not, the day marked the high point of most of the young pilots’ military careers, and many survivors have recorded their impressions. We chose Uffz. Klaus Hahn’s account as representative:

I transferred with 30 comrades to Sachau/Gardelegen on the night of April 4–5. I was given my own Bf 109G-6 or G-14 the morning of the 7th. The radio couldn’t transmit, only receive the Jägerwelle. The tank was half full. My machine was armed with one machine gun with 60 rounds. We took off on the green flare, but I couldn’t maintain speed, and fell behind my comrades in the climb. I had no thought of turning back, but kept on. I heard only marches on the radio. My aircraft suddenly gained speed, and I climbed to 10,000 meters [33,000 ft.], entirely alone. I approached four 109s, which proved to be Mustangs. One got on my tail, damaged the aircraft and wounded me in the throat. I decided to bail out despite the -50 degrees C temperature and lack of oxygen. But I saw a Fortress Pulk below, and decided to take one with me. My airplane was smoking, and the Mustangs didn’t follow. I was able to get up-sun, and dove on the far-right B-17 in the Pulk. I don’t know what happened next. There was a loud crash. I bailed out automatically, pulled the cord at 1,000 meters [3,300 ft.], apparently lost consciousness with the shock, and hit the ground hard, throwing both thighbones out of their sockets. Witnesses say the bomber didn’t crash, but I never found out exactly where I landed. I was wounded severely in one shoulder, arm, and hand. My left arm was amputated in a British POW hospital in June due to an infection. A quick recovery followed, and I was released in August [1945]. I later tried to find the village where I landed, but couldn’t—it must be between Steinhuder Meer and Verden, east of the Weser. I’m no longer interested, because the people who helped me are probably all dead now.

Most of the Elbe pilots attacked B-17s of the leading 3rd Air Division, which according to American records lost nine bombers to ramming and three to Me 262s. Four of the ramming victims were from the 452nd Bomb Group, which was awarded the Distinguished Unit Citation for its 40-minute-long combat. The only Luftwaffe fighters seen by the trailing 1st Air Division were two Me 262s, but the 2nd Air Division received some attacks, and according to the Americans lost four B-24s to ramming, two of these in a single attack that is well-documented from both sides. Gefreiter Willi Rösner dove on the 389th Bomb Group B-24 leading the division and rammed into its nose. Either the B-24 or the Bf 109 then careered into the deputy commander’s aircraft. Both B-24s crashed. Rösner bailed out, blacked out, regained consciousness on the ground with a broken collarbone, and returned to Stendal on the evening of the 7th. He was promoted to Unteroffizier and was awarded the Iron Crosses Second and First Class and the German Cross in Gold for this single mission, in violation of all directives.

The OKL war diary contains a bare-bones summary of the mission. Of the 183 fighters prepared for takeoff, 50 returned; 106 pilots had reported in by day’s end, claiming 23 successes. There were as yet no reports from 77 pilots. IX. Fliegerkorps (Jagd) was to order the remaining pilots to be released—the operation would not be repeated.

The Elbe mission remained somewhat of a mystery for decades after the war. The survivors were considered naive fools by other Luftwaffe veterans and, often, by their own families. But many of the Elbe-Männer eventually concluded that they had a right to take pride in the sacrificial mission for which they had volunteered, and began communicating with one another and cooperating with historians. As a result this is now one of the best-documented Luftwaffe missions of the war. Fritz Marktscheffel was an Elbe volunteer who did not fly on April 7 because he was too junior to be given one of the limited number of airplanes. He has for decades collected documents and pilot’s accounts pertaining to the mission, and his figures can be considered the best available. Marktscheffel concludes that about 188 Bf 109s were prepared for the mission at five bases in Germany and one outside Prague. About 143 fighters actually took off; 21 returned early due to technical defects; 15 from Stendal were never given a target and returned to base for lack of fuel; and those from Prague were recalled when the bombers turned north, putting them beyond range. About 90 contacted the enemy; as many as 40 attempted ramming attacks. Marktscheffel can identify the pilots in 18 ramming attacks on B-17s, three on B-24s, and three on unspecified heavy bombers. In addition, one B-17 and one fighter were claimed shot down by the single machine guns of the ram fighters. Casualties to the Elbe-Männer were surprisingly light: 18 pilots were killed, six failed to return and remained missing, and 13 were wounded. Sixteen bailed out and landed successfully; two died when their parachutes failed to open; and four were shot and killed by American fighter pilots while hanging on their chutes. Another pilot was shot at but suffered only a hard landing when his chute was shot through. Known Bf 109 losses total 13 to American escorts, three to German Flak, and 21 in ramming attacks; 14 force-landed for operational reasons after contacting the enemy.

The Elbe plots were told that they would be protected from American fighters by Me 262s, but there is no evidence that the jet pilots knew anything of this. Their primary mission was to attack bombers, not fighters, and this is what they did. Fifty-nine jets from JG 7 and I./KG(J) 54 were scrambled. JG 7 pilots claimed one F-4 (a reconnaissance P-38), two P-51s, one B-17, and one B-24, for no known losses. I./KG(J) 54 reported four victories over B-17s, and lost one Me 262 to a B-17 gunner.

Although the Eighth Air Force lost 17 bombers, the greatest loss on a bombing mission since February 3, and 189 more bombers returned to base with damage, it was certainly not in the Americans’ interest to publicize a successful suicide mission in the ETO while the Kamikazes were causing great concern in the Pacific, and the casualties due to ramming were downplayed. Allied intelligence professed no knowledge of a special operation. The Eighth Air Force mission summary concluded that,

While there were a number of instances of fighters ramming bombers, there is no evidence that these were intentional. In all cases the enemy aircraft was either out of control after being hit, or was manned by an inexperienced pilot trying a fly-through attack against a tight formation.

The sacrifices of the Elbe-Männer were thus not even acknowledged by the Americans, and certainly did not affect their morale, as Herrmann had hoped. Like Operation Bodenplatte, Werwolf was only a futile, bloody gesture.

Italian Naval Special Operations

Uomini Gamma. Divers of the special units of the Italian Navy.

 Italian Maiale manned torpedo "Siluro San Bartolomeo" displayed at the Royal Navy Submarine Museum, Gosport, UK.

Wreck of HMS York inspected by the crew of the Italian torpedo boat Sirio, moored alongside.

 This drawing shows a Norwegian tanker Thorshøvdi, broken in two by manned torpedoes launched from the Italian base-ship Olterra, August 1943.

The Italian Navy had successfully employed novel attack methods using special light craft (including underwater vehicles) against the Austrian fleet in the First World War. Renewed interest in these special attack methods began in 1935, but it initially came from the bottom up, via a couple of Regia Marina shore-based engineers, who began work on what eventually became the ‘piloted torpedo.’ In fact, despite the fact that their viability had been vividly demonstrated in the previous war, the attempt to re-start development of such specialized equipment and tactics at first met with an incomprehensible bureaucratic resistance. The personnel involved in these efforts were only allowed to work on them in the hours available after completing their normal daily duties’ or on their own personal time. And in 1936 the project was suspended completely, due mainly to the fact that Cavagnari and the ‘gun club’ believed that they would be superfluous weapons in a war decided by the battleships in major fleet actions (though Cavagnari and the submarine commander Falangola had both originally approved the project). This decision was only reversed in 1939, and so most assault methods were not fully ready for action until 1941-42.

There were four basic methods of attack incorporated in the special unit known by the cover name 10th MAS (‘decima mas’ to the Italians). Most effective were the piloted torpedoes’ (‘siluranti pilotati’), a small underwater vehicle built using an actual (but highly-modified) torpedo body, on which two crewmen fitted with breathing apparatus sat, straddling it as if riding a horse. The ‘piloted torpedo’ had a detachable 300-pound explosive warhead with a timer fuse, which would be slung beneath the keel of the target vessel’ the intent being to attack the enemy fleet in harbor after a stealthy underwater approach. The ‘piloted torpedoes’ were at first usually delivered to the vicinity of the enemy base by conventional submarines, although these were modified with the installation of three waterproof containers on the deck for the ‘torpedoes’ (safe at depths of up to 300 feet).

There were also under development larger underwater vessels, these being legitimate midget submarines. The Italians had two models, the two-man CA and the four-man CB (both types mounting two 450mm torpedo tubes). Neither, however, was ready for service before 1942, whereas the ‘piloted torpedoes’ were actually employed operationally in 1940, albeit ineffectively because technical preparation of both the ‘piloted torpedoes’ and in some cases the launch submarines had not been completed.

The 10th MAS also had surface elements, mainly in the form of small, fast motorboats. The ‘explosive motorboat’ was an actual bomb, loaded with 660 pounds of explosives, and set to crash into enemy ships by its single operator, who after locking the controls bailed out over the stern on to a special raft when 100 yards or so from the target vessel. The ‘assault motorboat’ was a bigger, two-man craft, fitted with a pair of torpedoes outboard. Both types could operate from shore bases, but due to their short range were often carried aboard larger surface ships and launched as close as possible to their intended target area (destroyers Crispi and Sella performed this duty for the successful Suda Bay operation, picket ship Diana in the disastrous July 1941 Malta attack’ later several small freighters were also modified to serve as launch ships).

Finally, the unit employed the simple method of specially-trained swimmers with breathing gear, towing mines.

The wartime operations of 10th MAS began with a series of bitter failures. In August 1940, prior to a planned assault on the main British Mediterranean Fleet base at Alexandria, the poorly-prepared launch sub Iride was sunk by British planes, a sitting duck on the surface because it could not dive with the ‘ piloted torpedoes’ on deck. In September 1940 twin attacks were nonetheless planned against Alexandria and Gibraltar. But again the launch sub for the Alexandria operation (Gondar, which had waterproof containers for its ‘piloted torpedoes’) was sunk, in this case by a British destroyer and a Sunderland flying boat. Meanwhile, Borghese in Scire successfully delivered his ‘piloted torpedoes’ to the immediate approaches of the British base at Gibraltar, and the ‘torpedoes’ penetrated the fleet anchorage, but due to defects in the ‘piloted torpedoes’ they all sank before reaching position to emplace their mines (one getting within less than 100 yards of battleship Barham).

There would be other failures for 10th MAS during the war’ for instance, sub Scire was sunk with all hands (including the crews of its ‘piloted torpedoes’) off Haifa in August 1942, after Borghese had moved on to other assignments. The most traumatic blow came in July 1941, an ambitious attempt to penetrate Malta’ s Grand Harbor by surface attack’ the plan was for ‘piloted torpedoes’ to blow a gap in the harbor boom, allowing ‘explosive motorboats’ to enter and target shipping just arrived in a major convoy. However, the Italians were detected by British radar on their approach, and massacred by Malta’ s efficient shore defenses, a grievous loss of 33 highly-trained specialists (15 killed, including 10th MAS commander Vittorio Moccagatta).

Despite these setbacks, from 1941 the special attack methods of 10th MAS achieved an impressive series of successes. The first was in March 1941, when ‘explosive motorboats’ entered the British naval base at Suda Bay on Crete, hitting the British heavy cruiser York (which was beached as a result, never to sail again), and also sinking tanker Pericles. In September 1941, the ‘piloted torpedoes’ had their first success, as three deposited off Gibraltar by Scire sank British fleet oiler Denbydale, small tanker Fiona Shell, and 11,000-ton merchantman Durham in the roadstead. 

December 1941 saw the greatest achievement for 10th MAS during the war, when Borghese and Scire deployed three ‘piloted torpedoes’ to Alexandria, their crews severely damaging battleships Queen Elizabeth (sank but settled in shallow water: raised and repaired, but out of action a year and a half) and Valiant (out eight months: of the ten First World War battleships possessed by the Royal Navy at the start of the war, Queen Elizabeth and Valiant’ along with Warspite’ were the only ones that had undergone complete modernization refits). The third ‘piloted torpedo’ in this attack mined tanker Sagona (so badly damaged that henceforth it was only used as a stationary fuel bunker: destroyer Jervis, tied alongside Sagona for fueling, was also damaged by the blast, and was under repair for a month).

The 10th MAS never replicated such spectacular results again, but did continue to strike blows. In July 1942, ‘frogman’ swimmers, covertly based at a house on the neutral Spanish shore nearby, sank four small freighters (Meta, Shuma, Snipe, and Baron Douglas, total about 11,000 tons) at Gibraltar. In September 1942 these swimmers sank another small merchantman at Gibraltar, Raven’ s Point. In December 1942 the 10th MAS tried to counterattack a target of opportunity following the Allied ‘Torch’ landings in French North Africa. The submarine Ambra (which had since been converted to carry ‘piloted torpedoes,’ in order to make up for previous submarine losses of 10th MAS) penetrated the harbor of Algiers, still crammed with Allied military shipping, and after a careful reconnaissance (one officer swam to the surface with a telephone connection to the submarine to survey the scene and pick targets before the actual launch), deployed three ‘piloted torpedoes’ plus swimmers. The results were somewhat disappointing to the Italians, after such a well-prepared attack: the small Norwegian freighter Berto (1,400 tons) was sunk, and freighters Ocean Vanquisher (7,000 tons), Empire Centaur (7,000 tons), and Armattan (4,500 tons) damaged.

#

The Italians had meanwhile devised a new way to attack Gibraltar’ s naval base. They converted the derelict Italian freighter Olterra, interned by neutral Spain at Algeciras, just across the bay from Gibraltar, into a secret base for ‘piloted torpedoes,’ complete with a hidden underwater sally port (reportedly taking great care to hide these extensive preparations from the neutral Spanish, although some collusion with sympathetic members of Franco’ s government was suspected). In May 1943 three ‘piloted torpedoes’ from Olterra sank freighters Pat Harrison (7,000 tons), Marhsud (7,500 tons), and Camerata (4,800 tons). In August 1943 ‘piloted torpedoes’ from Olterra struck Gibraltar again, sinking tanker Thorshoud (10,000 tons) along with merchantmen Harrison Grey Otis (7,000 tons) and Stanbridge (6,000 tons). And in July 1943, in an even more novel form of assault, a specialist swimmer, Lt. Luigi Ferraro, was smuggled into neutral Turkey (along with a supply of mines), with help from undercover agents of SIS in a special operation. Ferraro’ s task was to mine merchant ships of combatant nations in neutral Turkish harbors, using mines with long delay fuses. He claimed one victim sunk, the Greek steamer Orion (4,800 tons)’ the mine exploding a week after he planted it’ and managed to mine three other ships. One of these, the 4,900-ton freighter Kaituna, was damaged when one of the mines went off, but this prompted an examination which found a second, unexploded mine. The British then carefully inspected all the other ships in the area, finding and disarming Ferraro’ s mines on the two other vessels.

Elements of 10th MAS were also deployed to the Black Sea in 1942, in response to a German request for help. These included six of the CB-type midget submarines, getting their first operational use. In June 1942, during the Axis blockade of Sebastopol (the main Soviet base in the Crimea) CB-3 sank the Russian Stalin-class submarine S-32, and three days later CB-2 sank the smaller Shchuka-class sub Shch-306. The ‘assault motorboats’ also claimed to have sunk a 3,000-ton Soviet freighter with no survivors in operations interdicting traffic to Sebastopol. The ‘assault motorboats’ had one success in the Mediterranean, when a unit based in North Africa struck British destroyer Eridge while the latter was conducting shore bombardment operations. Eridge was towed back to Alexandria, but damage was so severe that the ship was subsequently written off rather than repaired.

Perhaps the most ambitious project of 10th MAS was one which never came to fruition. There were plans in 1942 to attack New York harbor using the smaller CA-type midget submarine. The submarine Da Vinci was removed from normal operations in the Atlantic and modified as a launch sub for this mission’ mainly by having its deck gun removed so that a single ‘CA’ midget submarine could be carried on its foredeck in a special cradle that was installed. But the operation was postponed and then eventually cancelled, Da Vinci having its deck gun remounted and returning to normal commerce raiding activities.

The term MAS also came to mean Mezzi d'Assalto, (Assault Vehicle) in the unit name Flottiglia MAS (Assault Vehicle Flotilla), the most famous of which was the Decima MAS of World War II.

Notable war actions performed by MAS include the torpedoing of the Royal Navy C-class cruiser HMS Capetown by MAS 213 of the 21st MAS Squadron working within the Red Sea Flotilla off Massawa, Eritrea; and the failed attack on the harbour of Malta in January 1941, which caused the loss of two motorboats, one of them recovered by the British. Five MAS were scuttled in Massawa in the first week of April 1941 as a part of the Italian plan for the wrecking of Massawa harbor in the face of British advance. MAS 204, 206, 210, 213, and 216 were sunk in the harbor; four of the boats were in need of mechanical repairs and couldn't be evacuated. On 24 July 1941, MAS 532 torpedoed and crippled the transport Sydney Star, which managed to limp to Malta assisted by the destroyer HMAS Nestor. MAS 554, 554 and 557 also sank three allied freighters on 13 August 1942, in the course of Operation Pedestal, for a total tonnage of 28,500 tn. On 29 August 1942, a smaller type of MAS boat, the MTSM, torpedoed and disabled for the rest of the war the British destroyer HMS Eridge off El Daba, Egypt.

Four MAS served at German request as Black Sea reinforcement in their intended attack on Sevastopol in June 1942. The MAS squadron came under intense air attack from Soviet fighter-bombers and torpedo boats but performed well in the role. They sank a 5,000 ton steamer and disabled a 10,000 ton transport, which was subsequently destroyed by Stuka dive-bombers. MAS boats destroyed troop barges and damaged Soviet warships. One MAS boat commander was killed in battle. One MAS was destroyed and three damaged by fighter-bombers in September 1942 during a heavy attack on Yalta.

The obsolescence of small MAS became apparent during the conflict, and they were increasingly replaced by larger Yugoslavian E-boats built in Germany and local copies of them (classified "MS" - Moto Siluranti by the Regia Marina).

Indeed, the Decima Mas did plan many spectacular missions for Italian midget submarines. Attacks on the British base at Freetown, Sierra Leone, on the west coast of Africa - and incredibly, on harbours along the east coast of the USA. The Freetown plan, for which the sub C.A.1 was allocated, was abandoned when it was decided that British defensive measures allowed no chance of success. However, the attack on New York reached an advanced stage. The operation was planned for December 1943. 

Quoting from Richard O'Neill's 'Suicide Squads' book:

' In mid-1942, in preparation for the New York raid, C.A.2 was transported overland to Bordeaux(France), where "Betasom", headquarters for Italian submarines operating in the Atlantic, was commanded by Capt Enzo Grossi. There, too, came the Marconi-class submarine Leonardo da Vinci of 1,190/1,489 tons (1209/1513 tonnes), selected as the midget's carrier. Under the direction of Cdr Borghese and SubLt Massano, Italian workshops at Bordeaux under Major (naval rank) Fenu removed Da Vinci's 3.9-inch (100mm) gun and in its place, just forward of the conning-tower, constructed a semi-recessed "pouch" with retaining shackles for C.A.2. This arrangement led to the mother boat being designated the Canguro ("Kangaroo"). Sea trials under Borghese's command proved to his satisfaction that the midget could be launched from the submerged Kangaroo and could be recovered when the mother boat surfaced beneath it. The latter point was important in avoiding any indication that the projected mission was regarded as suicidal: just so had the IJN made "official" plans to recover its midgets after Pearl Harbor. 

According to Borghese, the Kangaroo (not Da Vinci, which was sunk by British warships off the Azores in May 1943) would launch its midget while submerged off New York Bay. C.A.2 (or, in the later stages of the operational planning, the near identical C.A.3 or C.A.4) would make its way by night into the crowed harbour at the mouth of the Hudson. Two of the three crewmen, in frogmen's gear, would leave the boat to plant time-fused explosive charges-eight 220lb (100kg) charges and twenty 4.4lb (2kg) "limpets" were carried-under ships and against dock installations. Then C.A.2 would slip downriver to make rendezvous at sea with Kangaroo.' 

Many operational and technical difficulties made this operation very dubious: the assumption that New York harbour defences were weak and that the range of the C.A. series (no more than 70nm (129km) was sufficient for the craft to remain up the Hudson River for two days). 'Yet according to Borghese, only Italy's collapse in September 1943 prevented the mission from being carried out, as planned, in December of that year.'

The explosive boat concept was adopted by the German Navy and 'The Black Prince' Cdr. J. Valerio Borghese, remaining faithful to the Axis cause even after Italy's surrender, passed on his experience to German volunteers. Indeed the Italian military/navy pre-war had taught the Germans aerial torpedo bombing...and some other things as well...

Before Italy's collapse, however, two abortive missions were launched with the smaller MTR explosive boats. In mid-1943, following the Allied invasion of Sicily, it was planned to attack shipping in Syracuse harbour with MTRs. The submarine Ambra (Lt. Cdr. Renato Ferrini), carrying three MTRs in deck cylinders originally designed for transportation of Maiale ("pig" Italian manned torpedo with detachable warhead with two crew), stood off Syracuse on the night of 25th July 1943. But the activities of German U-Boats had put the harbour defences on full alert: picked up on the radars of patrolling aircraft, Ambra was bombed, depth charged, and forced to retire with heavy damage, including the crushing of the MTRs cylinders.

A similar mission was planned for 2nd October 1943, when the submarine Murena (Cdr. Longanesi), equipped with four transportation cylinders, was to launch four MTRs from the Spanish side of the Algerciras Bay. The boats were to make their way along the neutral shore and, at 1100 hours, carry out a near-suicidal daylight attack on merchant shipping at Gibraltar. In the resultant confusion, it was hoped, a Maiale launched from a secret base aboard the Olterra* would penetrate the military harbour and attack the largest warship in sight. The operation was forestalled by Italy's surrender on 8th September 1943.

#

*Olterra was an Italian freighter had been deliberately sabotaged at the beginning of the war and lay half-sunken in Spanish territorial waters. On the pretext of being repaired and handed over to Spain, she was raised and towed into Algeciras harbour, across the bay from the Allied military anchorage. In her hold was Maiale and Italian navy men, who slipped out through an underwater door for a series of raids on the Algeciras roadstead between September 1942 and August 1943 damaging 11 Allied merchant ships totaling some 55, 700 tonnes. At the time of Italy's collapse, preparations were being made aboard Olterra to launch the newly-received SSB-type Maiale against Gibraltar.

LINK

LINK

GRILLO PLUS WWI

In the aftermath of Rizzo's attack on Wien, the Austrians strengthened their boom defenses until hand-held hydraulic shears could no longer overcome them. The Italians responded with a special type of MAS, the Grillo or "Cricket." This was a slow, quiet, electrically driven boat inspired by the British rhomboid tanks. It combined the flat-bottomed hull of a landing craft with a pair of 45-cm torpedoes in side-dropping gear and two hook-studded, engine-driven chains mounted on either side of the hull. The Grillo could approach boom defenses quietly and clamber over them, much like a tank crushing barbed wire. Once inside the anchorage, it would attack with its torpedoes and retire the way it came. The Grillo was not very successful in action. The chain mechanism produced a frightful clatter that all but negated the advantage of the silent, 15-hp electric motor. They were usually destroyed by shellfire before they got over the booms. Nevertheless, the Austrian navy was interested enough to raise and copy a sunken example.

Although the Italian Navy started to test its first motor torpedo boats as early as 1906, it was only after Italy's entry into World War I in May 1915 that development progressed. The first craft was commissioned in April 1915, and was soon in production by the Venetian firm SVAN (Societa Veneziana Automobili Navali), so was named Motobarca Armata SVAN, `SVAN armed motorboat'. Following mass production by Isotta Fraschini and FIAT as well, it was renamed Motoscafo Armato Silurante, `armed torpedo motorboat', or MAS. (This acronym was also used for Motoscafo Anti Sommergibile, `anti-submarine motorboat', in which role these craft were sometimes used.) The concept of a motor torpedo boat not only introduced a major change to Italian naval doctrine, but also led to development of other special craft. These included the tracked light assault boat, specifically designed to climb over protection nets; and the `mignatta' (`leech'), subsequently developed into the Torpedine Semovente Rossetti or `Rossetti self-propelled torpedo' - the first attempt to modify a standard torpedo for manned use.

During World War I the Italian Navy mostly fought against the Austro-Hungarian Navy in the narrow waters of the Adriatic Sea. Both sides tried to avoid any fleet engagement that might have cost them irreplaceable major warships, and this led to the development of craft and tactics for `small warfare', with the aim of causing as much damage as possible while putting at risk only light and easily replaceable craft. For Italy, this effort was quite successful. By 1918 some 419 MAS had been produced, 244 of them operational; their most significant successes were the sinking of the Austro-Hungarian battleship Wien on 9 December 1917, and of the dreadnought Szent Istvan on 10 June 1918. But the real step forward was the employment of assault craft, which brought a new dimension to naval warfare. On 13 May 1918 the tracked assault boat Grillo (`Cricket') tried to penetrate the Austro-Hungarian naval base of Pola on the Istrian peninsula (today's Pula, Croatia), and though it ultimately failed it did overcome four of the first five obstacles it encountered.

Italy had now been at war for several years and needed a way of successfully attacking the Austrian main naval base at Pola, another craft had been developed by the Italians called the Grillo which was a fast boat armed with a torpedo, attached to its sides were tracks with hooks so it could haul itself over the tops of booms and torpedo nets. Its first attack was against the ships inside the defended harbour at Pola on the 13th May 1918 but it was a complete disaster, with the craft being put out of action and the crew being taken prisoner.

Another notable mission - although carried out at the time of the Austro-Hungarian surrender, after the fleet had been handed over to the future Yugoslavia - was the sinking of the battleship Viribus Unitis in Pola harbour on 1 November 1918 by a manned torpedo. (This did not really navigate underwater, but was manoeuvred under the bow of the battleship by swimming frogmen.)

By October it was decided it was time for Rossetti and Paolucci to try the craft, so on the night of 31st October 1918 with the Mignatta being carried on the deck of a torpedo boat and escorted by another boat, they left Venice and headed for Pola. When they were off the coast the Mignatta was lowered into the water and towed by the other boat until they were in reach of Pola harbour, they were on their own, it was now 2 am on 1st November. They entered the harbour after climbing over three sets of torpedo nets and pulling the Mignatta over the tops behind them.

Now inside the harbour they made for the Austrian Flagship Viribus Unitis, still undetected they approached the starboard side of the flagship, as they did the Mignatta started to malfunction, the flooding valve on its stern had opened causing it to lose buoyancy and sink. To prevent this the compressed air used to propel the craft had to be used to correct its buoyancy this now meant it had insufficient compressed air to escape from the harbour after the attack.

Regardless of this they carried on with the attack, Rossetti released one of the charges and attached it to the side of the flagship and set the delay fuse for two hours and returned to the Mignatta. Paolucci now headed at full speed towards the shore hoping to try and escape overland, by now it was 5 am. They were spotted by the crew on watch and were illuminated by searchlights, as a motor launch approached them Rossetti quickly set the delay fuse on the last charge and pushed the Mignatta away into the darkness on a slow speed. Rossetti and Paolucci were pulled from the water and taken on board the flagship to be questioned.

At 6.20 am the charge exploded, the flagship immediately listed 20 degrees to starboard, the crew started to abandon ship taking the two prisoners with them, 15 minutes later the 21, 000 ton battleship rolled over and sank. The Mignatta meanwhile had circled the harbour until the air ran out and had settled on the bottom under the hull of the liner Wien, which was being used as a submarine depot ship, the charge exploded sinking the ship.

The two Italians were not prisoners for long as on the 5'h November the Italians occupied Pola, after the armistice both were awarded medals of honour for their bravery and for the building of such a successful new weapon .