Japanese sources frequently credit RAdm. Masafumi Arima as
the inspiration for the beginning of the suicide attacks at the Philippines.
Arima commanded the 26th Air Flotilla which was based at Manila. On 15 October
1944, he decided to lead a strike against American carriers near Luzon, an
unusual undertaking for an officer of his high rank. Japanese reports claim
that Arima crashed his Zero into the carrier Franklin CV 13, but this is
unlikely. Neither Franklin nor the other carriers in the American force were
hit by kamikazes that day.
The official beginning of the Japanese Navy's kamikaze units
came on 19 October 1944 when VAdm. Takijiro Onishi toured the base of the 201st
Air Group at Mabalacat, Philippines. Onishi had just been appointed commander
of the First Air Fleet and recognized that Japan's position in the war was
tenuous. He suggested to the air group's leaders that suicide crashes were
their only chance to defeat the enemy. Within the hour the determination had
been made to use this extreme attack method and twenty-seven members of the
201st volunteered for the mission. These men were not poorly trained beginners
but were ranked among the best pilots in the air group. Lt. Yukio Seki, a
graduate of the Naval Academy, was selected as their leader.
What took place at Mabalacat was a new strategy, one that
would plan, organize and coordinate this attack method. A new strategy was
timely after the loss of 1,500 Japanese airmen in the Marianas. With so many
capable pilots gone, it would not be possible to replace them in a short space
of time.
The First Shimpu Special Attack Corps, having been formed at
Mabalacat, soon went into action. They consisted of four groups, the Asahi,
Shikishima, Yamato, and Yamazakura Units. On 21 October 1944, the corps began
conducting unsuccessful sorties over the ocean searching for American ships. On
the morning of 25 October 1944, at about 0730, six Zekes and their four escorts
from the Asahi and Yamato Units found RAdm. Thomas Sprague's group of escort
carriers off Samar. About the same time, Seki led the Shikishima Unit's five
bomb-laden Zekes and four escorts off the field at Mabalacat and, at 1045,
spotted another carrier group under RAdm. Clifton Sprague. Their attacks were
successful and one carrier was sunk and several others damaged. With the
success of these attacks in the Philippines, Onishi's strategy was validated.
From this point on, the use of special attack units would be given serious
consideration in any operation.
The experiences of the Japanese during the Philippines'
campaign demonstrated that the use of kamikaze planes was a viable alternative.
It had proven to be the most effective attack method, with a high percentage of
hits on American vessels. Of the 650 suicide missions flown during the
Philippines' campaign, nearly 27 percent were deemed successful. Part of this
success may be attributed to the use of the Zeke. Its good speed and
maneuverability gave it an advantage over the many obsolete types that would be
flown on the missions at Okinawa. In addition, the first of the kamikaze pilots
were veterans with significant flying skills. This would stand in sharp
contrast to the kamikaze pilots utilized during the Okinawa campaign, many of
whom had only basic flight training.
One might question how the Japanese expected to win the war
by the use of such tactics. By the time the American forces invaded Okinawa, it
was obvious to the Japanese that the possibility of victory had vanished and
that it was only a matter of time before the home islands were targeted for
invasion.
What did the Japanese high command hope to accomplish by sending its
young pilots to certain death? When faced with catastrophic losses, they had
few options. In an interview conducted by the Americans at the end of the war
Capt. Rikihei Inoguchi, of the Tenth Air Fleet, discussed the program's goals.
Inoguchi had been present at the inception of the kamikaze program in the
Philippines. He asserted that the Japanese never expected to win the war using
such methods. What was possible, however, was the achievement of acceptable conditions
for its termination. If the Americans were to sustain unacceptable losses from
the special attack units, then they might be willing to end the war with terms
more favorable to the Japanese. Lieutenant Col. Naomichi Jin, who served as
Chief of Liaison Staff in the Thirty-Second Army Intelligence during the battle
for Okinawa, identified four reasons for the adoption of kamikaze tactics:
1. There were no prospect of victory in the air by
employment of orthodox methods.
2. Suicide attacks were more effective because the power of
impact of the plane was added to that of the bomb, besides which the exploding
gasoline caused fire-further, achievement of the proper angle effected greater
speed and accuracy than that of normal bombing.
3. Suicide attacks provided spiritual inspiration to the
ground units and to the Japanese public at large.
4. Suicide attack was the only sure and reliable type of
attack at the time such attacks were made (as they had to be) with personnel
whose training had been limited because of shortage of fuel.
Propaganda value was certainly a consideration. Capt. Katsuo
Shima, head of the propaganda section of the Naval General Staff, instituted a
program that was aimed at convincing the Allies that the Japanese would commit
national suicide rather than surrender. The Special Attack Corps was held up as
an example of what the Allies could expect. In addition, Japanese news sources
wrote compelling stories of the heroism and successes of the kamikaze pilots.
In their desperation, the Japanese desire for a weapon that would end the
American threat overrode their common sense. The impetus toward further
development of the kamikaze concept was spurred on by exaggerated reports of
their early success. Civilian workers on the home front were encouraged to
emulate the sacrifice of the kamikazes in their daily tasks. If men could
willingly go to their deaths for the nation, surely workers at home could be
expected to make great sacrifices as well. Pilots committing themselves to the
ultimate sacrifice could also look forward to a reward. Almost from the
beginnings of the kamikaze campaign in the Philippines, the pilots were given
posthumous promotions. At first these were only one-rank promotions but soon a
two-rank promotion became the norm.
One of the curiosities of the kamikaze experience was the
appearance of a small number of Koreans among the ranks of the Tokko-tai.
Crewmen on the destroyer Luce picked up a Korean pilot after they had shot down
his plane. He indicated that he was a farmer who had been drafted into the
military and forced to become a kamikaze pilot. The Japanese had been accepting
Koreans for military service since 1938 and began drafting them in April of
1944. According to some sources, eleven Koreans eventually became members of
the Tokkotai. Among them were Capt. Kim San Phil, 2d Lt. Tak Kyon Hyen and Sgt.
1st Class Park Ton Fun, all of whom are honored at the Yasukuni Shrine and the
Chiran Peace Museum.
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