On 14 June 1944, Boeing B-29 Superfortresses struck for the
first time at the Japanese home islands. Most early raids were made at high
level (above c.30,000ft, 9150m), but although Japan’s air defence was deficient
in both AA guns and aircraft with the speed and combat ceiling successfully to
intercept the Superfortresses – of 414 B-29s lost, only 147 fell to Japanese
interceptors or AA fire – it was felt that the results of such operations did
not justify even the lowest loss rate.
Early in 1945, MajGen Curtis LeMay took over the
Marianas-based 21st Bomber Command from BrigGen Haywood Hansell, adopting a
policy of low-level incendiary raids at c.5–6,000ft (1500–1800m) by B-29s
virtually unarmed for extra speed. By August, LeMay could claim that fire raids
had completely shattered some 58 major cities and that by bombing alone Japan
would soon be “beaten back into the dark ages”. Fire raids indeed caused far
greater material and moral damage than the two atomic bombs: on 9–10 March, in a
raid by 325 B-29s, 15.8 sq miles (41 sq km) of Tokyo were gutted and c.84,000
killed and more than 100,000 injured (compared to c.78,000 dead and 68,000
injured in the atomic blast at Hiroshima). In a fire raid on Toyama on 1–2
August, no less than 99.5 per cent of the city was devastated. And when Prince
Konoye told the USSBS that the major factor in Japan’s decision to surrender
was “fundamentally ... the prolonged bombing by the B-29s”, he was speaking of
the fire raids. One Japanese statesman, however, referred to the atomic
destruction as “the big kamikaze that saved Japan”; meaning that the terrible
civilian casualties sustained in just these two strikes afforded a decisive
argument to the peace faction.
With fuel stocks low, factories and repair facilities
dislocated, and many aircraft lacking trained pilots or held in reserve for the
final kamikaze onslaught, the Japanese air arms proved unable to deal
effectively with the low-level raiders and thus increasingly resorted to
suicidal aerial ramming interceptions. Isolated instances had occurred earlier
in the war. On 4 July 1942, Lt Mitsuo Suitsu, enraged when his naval air
squadron’s field at Lae, New Guinea, was badly damaged by US bombers, fulfilled
a vow of vengeance by destroying a Martin B-26 Marauder in a head-on collision
with his Zero. The first Army pilot credited with such self-sacrifice was Sgt
Oda who, also flying from New Guinea and unable to maintain the altitude
conventionally to engage a B-17 that was “snooping” a Japanese supply convoy, brought
down the Fortress by ramming with his Nakajima Ki-43 “Oscar”.
Tai-atari (“body-crashing”) tactics were not invariably
fatal: a few US bombers were destroyed by Soviet-style Taran attacks, their
tail assemblies chewed away by fighters with armoured propellers. USAAF
personnel reported the first cases of what they judged to be deliberate ramming
during a raid on the steel works at Yawata, Kyushu, on 20 August 1944. Of four
bombers lost over the target area, one fell to AA, one to aerial gunfire, and two
to a single Kawasaki Ki-45 Toryu (Dragon Killer; “Nick”): the “Nick” rammed one
B-29 and the debris of the two aircraft brought down another.
In February 1945, an IJA manual stated that against B-29s
(and the expected B-32 Dominators, of which only a handful became operational)
“we can demand nothing better than crash tactics, ensuring the destruction of
an enemy aircraft at one fell swoop ... striking terror into his heart and
rendering his powerfully armed planes valueless by the sacrifice of one of our
fighters”. The manual noted that only partly trained pilots need be used and
recommended as rammers the Nakajima Ki-44 Shoki (Demon; “Tojo”) and Kawasaki
Ki-61 Hien (Swallow; “Tony”), on the dubious grounds that their designs gave
the pilot a faint chance of baling out immediately before impact.
Earlier than this, in November 1944, the 2nd Air Army’s 47th
Sentai formed the volunteer Shinten Sekutai squadron, dedicated to ramming
attacks in “Tojos”. Their successes included the destruction of a B-29 over Sasebo
on 21 November by Lt Mikihiko Sakamoto; another B-29 on 24 November (one of
only two Superfortresses brought down in a 111-strong raid); and two B-29s (out
of only six lost from a 172-strong force over Tokyo) on 25 February 1945.
Fighters of the Kwantung Army also adopted ramming tactics, bringing down two
B-29s over the Mukden aircraft works on 7 December 1944 and another on 21
December. On both occasions, Japanese aircraft also attempted air-to-air
bombing, releasing time-fuzed phosphorus bombs above the US formations. At
least one B-29 was destroyed by this method, which was also used in the defence
of the homeland.
A less extreme measure than ramming was the formation at
Matsuyama NAFB, Shikoku, in January 1945 of a fighter wing led by Capt Minoru Genda
and including Saburo Sakai and other “aces”. Flying the Kawanishi N1K2-J Shiden
(Violet Lightning: “George”) – probably Japan’s best interceptor; only c.350
were built – they achieved especially good results against Allied carrier
strikes. On 16 February, WO Kinsuke Muto was credited with engaging
single-handed 12 F6F Hellcats from USS Bennington over Atsugi, Tokyo, shooting
down four and driving off the rest.
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