Tuesday, May 19, 2015

Earth Turns Toward Heaven




A Kaiten Type 1 being trial-launched from the light cruiser Kitakami.

One early November morning, personnel at Otsushima, a submarine base on a barren island near the southern tip of Honshu, mustered for a special ceremony. Officers, sailors and trainees lined up at attention under a cold, cloudy sky on either side of a long walkway sloping from the headquarters building of Special Base Unit One down to the docks. Three IJN submarines—I-36, I-37, and I-47—were lined up, their crews turned out and standing at attention along the subs’ rails. Mounted atop the deck of each sub, forward of the conning tower, were four objects which, considering their size, shape, construction, and deep black hue, might have been each big sub’s set of quadruplets.
On cue, a coterie of twelve men, each wearing a sleek new, one-piece uniform topped by a gleaming white ceremonial headband (called a hachimaki), emerged from the headquarters building. They strode briskly through the cordon of cheers, under the fluttering banners and past the toots and thumps of a small brass band. Leading the twelve was Sub-Lieutenant Sekio Nishina.

A year before, then Ensign Nishina and another IJN junior officer, Lieutenant Hiroshi Kuroki, had sown the seeds of this day’s send-off. Both were stationed at Otsushima and consumed with devising ways to make better use of the IJN’s best, but woefully underused, weapon—the Type 93 torpedo, what Americans called the Long Lance. In losing at Midway and being chased from the Solomons, the IJN had found ever fewer opportunities to use the Type 93 against American Navy ships.
The solution Kuroki and Nishina struck upon was both elegant and audacious: increase the Type 93’s explosive payload, expand its hull to accommodate a human pilot, and configure it to be launched underwater from the deck of a fleet submarine. The two young officers then weathered months of bureaucratic intransigence to successfully champion a weapon whose final form was remarkably similar to their initial vision.

The first kaiten (roughly translated as “turn toward Heaven”) was in fact a Type 93 torpedo split and widened to make room for its pilot, additional fuel and oxygen tanks, and an explosive payload triple the size of a conventional Type 93 warhead. Throughout the development process, kaiten planners and designers had gone through the motions of including ways for kaiten pilots to flee the craft just before striking a target. Indeed, an escape hatch was built into the bottom of the craft. Still, nearly all its trainees considered the kaiten to be a subsurface Tokkotai weapon—a “sure to die” coffin.
Just two months before, kaiten prototype testing had cost Hiroshi Kuroki’s life. Trapped underwater for hours in a kaiten, Kuroki had dutifully made observations and taken notes up to the moment of his asphyxiation. This day, as Nishina made his way to the waiting submarines, he carried a ceremonial box containing Kuroki’s ashes. When the twelve men (each, including Nishina, now a fully trained kaiten pilot) reached the docks, there was a hushed pause as the pilots bowed before a Shinto shrine. Then, in groups of four, the kaiten pilots went aboard the subs to which they’d been assigned.
Each climbed atop one of the kaitens and, brandishing ceremonial swords they’d received as gifts, waived triumphantly to the cheering well-wishers. Crewmen soon cast off lines, and the subs got underway for a top secret destination and one-way missions for the twelve kaitens.


Kaiten crew members salute aboard I-47 Submarine

Ulithi, seen through the periscope of Japanese submarine I-47 on the morning of 19 November, was indeed a target paradise. The I-47 hovered just below the surface near islands on the west side of the atoll. Lieutenant Commander Zenji Orita, I-47’s skipper, sighted three cruisers and, beyond to the southwest, the outsized profiles of battleships and aircraft carriers. Other ships were moored at the center of the harbor, and distant wisps of stack smoke confirmed the presence of still more.

There was no need to doubt the accuracy of aerial reconnaissance reports relayed to the kaiten mother submarines. Ulithi lagoon was crammed: four fleet aircraft carriers, three battleships, and numerous cruisers, destroyers, transports, oilers, and other auxiliary vessels—perhaps two hundred ships in all.
Beginning with Sekio Nishina, I-47’s CO Orita gave each of the kaiten pilots a chance to look through the scope. Nishina stared for two long minutes before abruptly relinquishing the scope to the next man. Later that day he wrote in his diary of the “golden opportunity to use kaiten.”

One of the ships Orita, Nishina, and the three other kaiten pilots may have seen through I-47’s periscope on the morning of the 19th was auxiliary oiler Mississinewa (Miss), part of Service Squadron (ServRon) 10. After completing an early underway replenishment (unrep) in the Philippine Sea, Miss had returned to Ulithi on 15 November. The crew spent all the next day filling Miss’s tanks to near capacity: 404,000 gallons of aviation gas, 9,000 barrels of diesel oil, and 90,000 barrels of fuel oil. Miss then moved to anchorage in berth No. 131 near sister oilers Lackawanna (AO-40) and Cache (AO-67).

For Miss’s three-hundred-man crew the days were mostly filled with routine drudgery and overwhelming heat. At night, though, there might be a break (at least for those not on watch)—a chance to watch a movie under Ulithi’s open, secure skies. The movie for the night of 19 November was Black Parachute, a spy thriller about secret agents battling Nazis.

After the movie, some sailors headed belowdecks to bunks in the sauna-like berthing compartments. Others, like Winston Whitten, 22, chose to spend the night topside. Whitten, a tool and dye maker before the war and now a 1st Class motor machinist’s mate, had taken in the screening of Black Parachute before standing midwatch in Miss’s engine room. Relieved from watch at 0400, Whitten and a buddy, instead of bunking below, strapped hammocks to stanchions on Miss’s after cargo deck. They joined dozens of other Miss crewmen already asleep here and on the forward cargo deck. It was cooler—at least compared to the engineering spaces and berthing compartments. Through breaks in the ever-threatening monsoon clouds, they also got a tropical sky full of stars.

Earlier that same evening, over a farewell dinner, the kaiten pilots toasted their mission with fine sake in ceremonial lacquer bowls, a gift reported to be from the Emperor himself. After dinner the four men purified themselves with spring water and all, except Sekio Nishina, shaved and trimmed their hair. They then retired to their bunks and their thoughts.

At 0300, Nishina and another of the kaiten pilots crawled through watertight access tunnels connecting I-47’s interior with the bottom hatches of their kaitens. These hatch exits—ostensibly installed as escape routes for the kaiten pilots—now doubled as entrances. Unfortunately, it had only been possible to equip each mother submarine with two of these conduits. Accordingly, just after midnight, I-47 had surfaced briefly to permit the two other kaiten pilots to enter their craft to await the launch. Then I-47 submerged for its final approach into Ulithi.

The launches began at 0415. Nishina’s craft was released first; the others followed at five-minute intervals. All four kaitens were underway by 0430, each tracking independently to a specific target area within the lagoon, each scheduled to strike at 0500.

The kaiten pilots could adjust their crafts’ depth, attack course, and speed by manipulating controls for diving planes, a rudder and a valve mechanism that helped steady the craft by letting in seawater as fuel was consumed. The ideal speed was 20 to 30 knots, the ideal depth was fifteen feet—a piloting challenge under the best of conditions and a consummate feat for men about to die. For all intents and purposes, each traveled blind. Instructed not to rise to periscope depth until just before impact, the pilots depended on initial target bearing and range, adjusting en route to the readings of their gyro-compasses and stopwatches.

By 0545 the day had already begun for many of the crewmen on ships moored at Ulithi. The sky was filling with light and predawn C.A.P.; the calm harbor waters below were scribbled by the wakes of whaleboats, harbor shuttles, and patrol craft. Aboard Miss, Fernando (Cookie) Cuevas, 33, had been awake since well before reveille. Cookie Cuevas and two other cooks were busy in Miss’s crew galley, located in the deckhouse aft, readying breakfast.

Herb Daitch, the ship’s No. 2 winch operator was also awake and sitting on the edge of his bunk when, at 0547, Miss’s aviation forward gas storage tanks exploded. The blast concussion tossed Daitch and other sailors in the compartment to the deck like bowling pins. Cookie Cuevas was checking a galley oven when he was knocked down too. Cuevas didn’t know what it was, but it felt big and bad. He grabbed a life jacket and headed to the crew quarters one deck below.

Sleep turned to a cauldron—a waking, living, and dying nightmare—for men who’d been sleeping on Miss’s forward cargo deck. Most were set on fire, 15 were killed instantly. On the after cargo deck, sailors like Whitten, who’d suffered no worse than a hard fall from his hammock, raced forward on the starboard side only to be chased back by the intense heat.

In officer’s country above decks on the port side, the blast woke Charley Scott with a start. He instinctively jumped from his upper bunk only to land on the shoulders of his roommate Jim Lewis. Once they’d untangled themselves, Scott and Lewis looked through their porthole, but couldn’t see what happened. Both men jumped into trousers and shoes, and ran out to investigate. Though he had seen nothing yet, Scott was all but certain Miss was doomed.

On his way from the galley, Cookie Cuevas woke sailors in the berthing compartments. When he reached the stern, the ship’s midsection was rocked by another explosion. The noise of this explosion rose above the screams of injured men. Then came the panic-mad whoops and bells of calls to battle stations from ships all across the lagoon.

Already, a flaming oil skim was hugging Miss’s hull forward, flowing aft like a turgid river. While there were some patches of black slick near the stern and more forming, there were also huge swaths of translucent lagoon water—a sight once so ordinary now turned vital for those trying to escape. Some sailors jumping into the water picked their spots carefully, while others dove blindly. Winston Whitten, one of the first over the port side, was scooped up by Miss’s own whaleboat, which soon headed for oiler Lackawanna, loaded to the gunwales with survivors.

For a few minutes Charley Scott thought he was trapped on Miss’s superstructure, but he managed to find a ladder leading down to the main deck. He also jumped off the port side, well clear of the oil, and swam a strong stroke to get as far away as possible. A whaleboat from Cache stopped and offered to pick him up, but Scott declined, motioning the coxswain to keep heading toward Miss.

Herb Daitch was purposely not wearing a life jacket as he readied himself to jump—and he urged others around him to take theirs off too. Daitch knew if he ended up surrounded by oil, he’d have to get underwater fast. Cookie Cuevas, meanwhile, faced a momentary dilemma. Frank Lutz, Miss’s Chief Commissary Steward, standing calmly on the fantail kept telling Cuevas: “You’ve got plenty of time.” Lutz was Cuevas’s boss, and he didn’t want to seem disrespectful, but finally he couldn’t wait any longer. “I’m gone!” Cuevas yelled back to Lutz as he dropped over the side.

At 0830, Miss rolled and sank into the sandy bottom of Ulithi’s spotless lagoon. Many of her 63 fatalities went with her, entombed in a hulk that continued to leak oil for decades. Others, including Frank Lutz, failed to make it out of the water alive. Survivors Daitch and Whitten ended the morning on Lackawanna and Cookie Cuevas on Enoree (AO-69). Charley Scott finally made it to Cache, which also sheltered Jim Lewis and Miss CO Philip Beck. Scott doubled as Miss’s communications officer, so he spent the rest of the day on Cache’s bridge, communicating by TBS with other ships to track down the locations of survivors.

Lexington was then at Ulithi undergoing round-the-clock repair. Blue Ghost diarist Bob Davis sensed the pace of repair would soon send them back at sea. Meanwhile, in the way of sailors who learned to compartmentalize war’s tragedies, Davis had only a brief entry about the “two-man subs” across the lagoon. “Luckily we spotted them before they did too much damage. They did blow up one of our tankers, tho.”


Warships Were Sacred Entities

Musashi



Midway, had sapped Yamamoto’s confidence, and thereafter conservation rather than expenditure of force became the watchword in the imperial fleet. On June 4, the admiral had sat on Yamato’s flag bridge digesting every morsel of the Kido Butai’s disaster with groans of anguish. Putting in at Truk several months later with his fleet on the way to the Solomons, Yamamoto seems to have had a premonition of impending personal as well as national calamity, writing to a friend, “I sense that my life must be completed in the next hundred days.” So Yamamoto, the supreme gambler, lost his nerve. Instead of throwing his two finest battleships into the fight for Guadalcanal at its climactic moment, he dispatched the old battle cruisers Kirishima and Hiei. The sea-air battles of mid-November that concluded with a dramatic night duel between capital ships sealed Japan’s fate. Hiei was mauled by Callahan’s gallant cruisers and destroyers on the night of the twelfth, then bombed to death the next morning. Kirishima, returning two nights later at the head of another cruiser-destroyer force, led by Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondo, found the fast new battleships Washington and South Dakota waiting along with four destroyers. The battle did not go all the Americans’ way. The destroyer force was wiped out, and South Dakota suffered a massive failure to its electrical system that kept it useless for long moments while Japanese gunfire pummeled its upper works. But that left Washington free to shoot Kirishima to pieces, and the battle cruiser was scuttled the next morning. Kondo, on the bridge of the cruiser Atago, had had enough and rushed away. The Japanese would never again send a battleship force against Guadalcanal and Henderson Field.

Historians can profitably imagine what would have happened if Admiral Willis Augustus Lee on the nights of November 14–15, 1942, had confronted both—or even one—of Japan’s superbattleships. Standing out of range of American 16-inch guns, Yamato and Musashi would have pounded Washington and South Dakota under the water before turning their huge 18-inch batteries on Henderson Field. With the Cactus Air Force ripped to pieces, the two Japanese ships could have returned night after night until the U.S. Marines and Army units would have either surrendered or evacuated. The battleship might well have resumed its place as queen of the seas. Instead, by refusing to risk his most precious ships in admittedly perilous circumstances, Yamamoto lost Hiei, Kirishima, the battle, the campaign, and whatever faint chance Japan might have had to keep its fledgling oceanic and East Asian empire through stalemate.

Yamamoto’s faintheartedness reflected a peculiar aspect of the Japanese character that contributed to that island nation’s defeat. To the people of Nippon, enmeshed in both a warrior culture and a scarcity economy, warships were sacred entities. Each of the big carriers and battlewagons carried a portrait of the emperor, and the loss of any one of these vessels was deemed a national disaster spiritually as well as economically. Crews believed their ships to be irreplaceable, and they fought those ships to the bitter end; the few who at last abandoned a sinking or burning vessel did so in tears. Not so the Americans. Ships, however much they might be a temporary or even long-term home, were, in the last analysis, pieces of machinery that were expendable. When they could no longer function, they were abandoned, with regret to be sure but with anticipation that a replacement would soon be on the way. Although a few men wept at seeing their ship go down or burn uncontrollably, the great majority seem to have taken the attitude of two sailors on the sinking Hornet at Santa Cruz. As they went down the lines from the fatally stricken carrier, one asked the other if he would reenlist. “Goddamit, yes,” the other replied. “On the new Hornet.” The supreme irony of Yamato and Musashi was that their very existence as the world’s greatest battleships precluded their effective use. By the end of January 1943, the Japanese conceded defeat, moved their fleet back to Truk, and over a two-night period removed the last of their by now starving and tattered troops from Guadalcanal.

The Imperial Japanese Navy was burdened by more than the low morale of its commander during the Solomons campaign. It simply did not possess the detailed intelligence of enemy strength and movement available to the Americans through the breaking of the Purple Code. Throughout the Pacific war, the Japanese navy fought blind in many ways on many fronts: its intelligence was poor to nonexistent, its radar belated and crude, and its antisubmarine instruments rudimentary. In technology as in so many other areas, the Japanese were simply overwhelmed, as Yamamoto surely understood.

Kamikaze I





Japanese sources frequently credit RAdm. Masafumi Arima as the inspiration for the beginning of the suicide attacks at the Philippines. Arima commanded the 26th Air Flotilla which was based at Manila. On 15 October 1944, he decided to lead a strike against American carriers near Luzon, an unusual undertaking for an officer of his high rank. Japanese reports claim that Arima crashed his Zero into the carrier Franklin CV 13, but this is unlikely. Neither Franklin nor the other carriers in the American force were hit by kamikazes that day.

The official beginning of the Japanese Navy's kamikaze units came on 19 October 1944 when VAdm. Takijiro Onishi toured the base of the 201st Air Group at Mabalacat, Philippines. Onishi had just been appointed commander of the First Air Fleet and recognized that Japan's position in the war was tenuous. He suggested to the air group's leaders that suicide crashes were their only chance to defeat the enemy. Within the hour the determination had been made to use this extreme attack method and twenty-seven members of the 201st volunteered for the mission. These men were not poorly trained beginners but were ranked among the best pilots in the air group. Lt. Yukio Seki, a graduate of the Naval Academy, was selected as their leader.

What took place at Mabalacat was a new strategy, one that would plan, organize and coordinate this attack method. A new strategy was timely after the loss of 1,500 Japanese airmen in the Marianas. With so many capable pilots gone, it would not be possible to replace them in a short space of time.
The First Shimpu Special Attack Corps, having been formed at Mabalacat, soon went into action. They consisted of four groups, the Asahi, Shikishima, Yamato, and Yamazakura Units. On 21 October 1944, the corps began conducting unsuccessful sorties over the ocean searching for American ships. On the morning of 25 October 1944, at about 0730, six Zekes and their four escorts from the Asahi and Yamato Units found RAdm. Thomas Sprague's group of escort carriers off Samar. About the same time, Seki led the Shikishima Unit's five bomb-laden Zekes and four escorts off the field at Mabalacat and, at 1045, spotted another carrier group under RAdm. Clifton Sprague. Their attacks were successful and one carrier was sunk and several others damaged. With the success of these attacks in the Philippines, Onishi's strategy was validated. From this point on, the use of special attack units would be given serious consideration in any operation. 

The experiences of the Japanese during the Philippines' campaign demonstrated that the use of kamikaze planes was a viable alternative. It had proven to be the most effective attack method, with a high percentage of hits on American vessels. Of the 650 suicide missions flown during the Philippines' campaign, nearly 27 percent were deemed successful. Part of this success may be attributed to the use of the Zeke. Its good speed and maneuverability gave it an advantage over the many obsolete types that would be flown on the missions at Okinawa. In addition, the first of the kamikaze pilots were veterans with significant flying skills. This would stand in sharp contrast to the kamikaze pilots utilized during the Okinawa campaign, many of whom had only basic flight training.
One might question how the Japanese expected to win the war by the use of such tactics. By the time the American forces invaded Okinawa, it was obvious to the Japanese that the possibility of victory had vanished and that it was only a matter of time before the home islands were targeted for invasion. 

What did the Japanese high command hope to accomplish by sending its young pilots to certain death? When faced with catastrophic losses, they had few options. In an interview conducted by the Americans at the end of the war Capt. Rikihei Inoguchi, of the Tenth Air Fleet, discussed the program's goals. Inoguchi had been present at the inception of the kamikaze program in the Philippines. He asserted that the Japanese never expected to win the war using such methods. What was possible, however, was the achievement of acceptable conditions for its termination. If the Americans were to sustain unacceptable losses from the special attack units, then they might be willing to end the war with terms more favorable to the Japanese. Lieutenant Col. Naomichi Jin, who served as Chief of Liaison Staff in the Thirty-Second Army Intelligence during the battle for Okinawa, identified four reasons for the adoption of kamikaze tactics: 

1. There were no prospect of victory in the air by employment of orthodox methods.
2. Suicide attacks were more effective because the power of impact of the plane was added to that of the bomb, besides which the exploding gasoline caused fire-further, achievement of the proper angle effected greater speed and accuracy than that of normal bombing.
3. Suicide attacks provided spiritual inspiration to the ground units and to the Japanese public at large.
4. Suicide attack was the only sure and reliable type of attack at the time such attacks were made (as they had to be) with personnel whose training had been limited because of shortage of fuel.  

Propaganda value was certainly a consideration. Capt. Katsuo Shima, head of the propaganda section of the Naval General Staff, instituted a program that was aimed at convincing the Allies that the Japanese would commit national suicide rather than surrender. The Special Attack Corps was held up as an example of what the Allies could expect. In addition, Japanese news sources wrote compelling stories of the heroism and successes of the kamikaze pilots. In their desperation, the Japanese desire for a weapon that would end the American threat overrode their common sense. The impetus toward further development of the kamikaze concept was spurred on by exaggerated reports of their early success. Civilian workers on the home front were encouraged to emulate the sacrifice of the kamikazes in their daily tasks. If men could willingly go to their deaths for the nation, surely workers at home could be expected to make great sacrifices as well. Pilots committing themselves to the ultimate sacrifice could also look forward to a reward. Almost from the beginnings of the kamikaze campaign in the Philippines, the pilots were given posthumous promotions. At first these were only one-rank promotions but soon a two-rank promotion became the norm. 

One of the curiosities of the kamikaze experience was the appearance of a small number of Koreans among the ranks of the Tokko-tai. Crewmen on the destroyer Luce picked up a Korean pilot after they had shot down his plane. He indicated that he was a farmer who had been drafted into the military and forced to become a kamikaze pilot. The Japanese had been accepting Koreans for military service since 1938 and began drafting them in April of 1944. According to some sources, eleven Koreans eventually became members of the Tokkotai. Among them were Capt. Kim San Phil, 2d Lt. Tak Kyon Hyen and Sgt. 1st Class Park Ton Fun, all of whom are honored at the Yasukuni Shrine and the Chiran Peace Museum.